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Drawing on a national survey – the 2011 BritishWorkplace Employment Relations Study (WERS 2011) – this paper
examines whether the associations between industry sectors, family ownership and calculative human resource
management (CHRM) vary between firms of different sizes. The analysis of 1,293 establishments in the UK suggests
that the associations between service industries and CHRM are stronger in smaller than in large firms, whereas
family ownership (primarily family-owned and -managed businesses) is significantly and negatively associated with
the prevalence of CHRM in large organisations compared to smaller businesses. Overall, the study suggests that:
(1) smaller businesses tend to be more coerced to take on CHRM for legitimacy recognition than large organisations;
and (2) extending an academically long-held wisdom, owner-management among family businesses has a
significantly deleterious effect on the uptake of CHRM in large organisations than in smaller firms.
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Introduction
Extensive human resource management (HRM) research
in smaller businesses – often dubbed small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) over the past three
decades – has suggested that SMEs are not a
‘scaled-down’ version of large firms (Storey, 2004,
p.115; Welsh & White, 1981). Research has generally
supported that the manner of HRM in SMEs is subject
to a range of unique contextual characteristics that may
not be applicable in large firms (e.g. Marlow, 2006).
Frequent face-to-face communication, for example,
coupled with high heterogeneity renders formalisation in
SMEs redundant (Greene, 1993; Storey, 1994). This
popularises the view of small-is-beautiful and questions
the appropriateness of prescribing the rational, calculative
and performance-orientated HRM practices (also termed
calculative HRM or CHRM for short) (Storey, 1994;
Gooderham et al., 2018) widely reported among large
firms to SMEs (Goss et al., 1994).
The alternative organisational growth and development
perspective, by contrast, argues that formalisation becomes
inevitable when firms grow (Mintzberg & Waters, 1990;
Reid et al., 2000). Hence, the widely reported deleterious
effect of owner-management (family-owned and managed)
on formality among SMEs is expected to taper when a
business grows, in that effective management tools are
needed to handle heightened organisational complexity
(Baird & Meshoulam, 1988). Limited research of family
ownership among large firms generally reflects a
worry-free stance hidden in the strategic HRM literature,
where a big-is-better view dominates.
Two theories underpin these contrasting views. First,
institutional theorists argue that organisations striving to
gain social recognition and legitimacy within a
fast-changing and open environment tend to be rational
and calculative in adopting (or converge at) specific HRM
practices (Paauwe & Boselie, 2003; Wood et al., 2014;
Gooderham et al., 2018). Firms, in response to such
institutional influence, undergo a process of adjusting
organisational structure, which will eventually shape
management patterns; this organisational process tends to
be stable or even persistent (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011,
p. 326). Among various institutional factors, research has
reported that industrial regulations have a direct impact on
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the manner of HRM across businesses (Jaffe et al., 1995;
Combs et al., 2006), and the causal link tends to be linear.
Compared to manufacturing, the service industry is more
subject to industrial regulations, particularly in relation to
new codes of conduct, and is more pressured to adopt
innovative practices in order to abide by fast-changing
conduct rules (Field, 2007; Higginbottom, 2015). This is
largely due to business outcomes in services, such as health
care, finance and education, that rely heavily upon
employee–customer interactions; installing novel
management practices to improve employees’ skills and
knowledge in providing high quality customer
consumption experience is imperative (Morrison, 1996;
Boxall, 2003). However, a large number of studies
conducted among SMEs (e.g., Westhead & Storey, 1996;
Harney & Dundon, 2006) and recent developments in the
path dependence model all hint that such regulatory impact
is likely to vary between firms of different sizes (Sydow
et al., 2009), which still awaits empirical evidence.
Second, organisational imprinting theory suggests that
organisational patterns set and managed by an
owner/founder have persistent effects on a wide array of
outcomes across decades and different generations (Baron
et al., 1999; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Marquis &
Tilcsik, 2013). Following this line of argument, the
deleterious effect of owner-management reported among
SMEs is likely to last even when they grow into large
organisations. However, the divide between SME
literature and that in strategic HRM (which is
predominately based upon large firms) suggests that the
human resource (HR) issues SMEs face are likely to be
replaced by a distinctive category of HR problems (Baird
& Meshoulam, 1988; Marlow, 2006) when they grow;
thus, owner-management is no longer a hurdle for
professionalisation in large organisations. Despite this,
emerging research speculates large owner-managed
organisations, fearing family control and wealth are at
risk, may endeavour to escape any attempts to engage
professional management (Anderson & Reeb, 2004),
allowing the owner-management footprints to remain
and continue to influence the business patterns on a daily
basis, likely lasting long-term. The extent to which the
imprinting effect of owner-management on the
implementation of CHRM would hold among large firms
is yet to be empirically established.
In this paper, we address the two gaps through focusing
on firm size as a moderator as opposed to a control
variable documented in prior strategic HRM studies
largely informed by institutional theory. This is because
firm goals, as well as HRM strategy, are likely to change
when firms either grow or scale down (Kotlar et al., 2014).
Empirical studies report that firm size positively
moderates the association between family ownership and
the hire of non-family managers within SMEs (Barrett &
Rainnie, 2002; Fang et al., 2016) as well as the association
between managers’ awareness of HRM and the
introduction of employee engagement practices in small
firms (Kroon et al., 2013). However, there is no research
to examine the moderation effect of firm size across firms
of different sizes, ranging from small to large
organisations.
In doing so, this research contributes to extant literature
in three ways. First, it contributes to the theoretical
discussion by evaluating whether the institutional and/or
imprinting effect on CHRM is dependent upon firm size.
Second, it bridges the literature of small business
management and strategic HRM literature by evaluating
the relationship between industry, family ownership and
CHRM practices across firms of different sizes. Third,
the findings contribute to the family business management
literature by stressing that the association between family
ownership and informality varies between SMEs and
large organisations. We suggest that future research would
benefit from extending the study of family businesses to
firms of different sizes rather than restricting it to the
SME sector, considering the latter dominates the family
business management literature.
It should be noted at the outset that this study makes no
claim to identify the performance impact of specific
bundles of HRM practices; we use the term ‘calculative
HRM’ loosely to reflect that performance-oriented
practices are default calculative ones, and the
Anglo-Saxon HRM approach is largely characterized as
calculative HRM for its performance focus (see Poutsma
et al., 2006 for a review). Hence, the term ‘calculative
HRM’ used here should not be confused with Gooderham
et al.’s (1999) or Gooderham et al.’s (2018) calculative
measures where communication and consultation among
employees are categorised as collaborative practices.
Instead, we use the term to encapsulate practices such as
consultative committee and mirror that engagement
practices facilitate employees’ cooperation, improve
organisations’ internal social structures and eventually
enhance organisational performance (Combs et al., 2006).
The association between industries and
CHRM
Industry rivalries and regulations are deemed influential
over the prevalence of CHRM practices in workplaces
(Combs et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2014). The landscape
of economy has vastly changed by transitioning from a
manufacturing economy to a service economy (Hislop,
2013). Compared to capital intensive manufacture
industry, where organisations must comply with industry
regulations in order to produce and market products (Jaffe
et al., 1995), business outcomes in services such as health
care, finance and education are more reliant upon
employee-customer interactions; investment in updating
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workforce knowledge base and providing high quality
customer consumption experience is crucial
(Morrison, 1996; Boxall, 2003). Investment in teamwork
training among medical consultants, nurses, and allied
professionals, such as support workers, has been a
common practice within the global health care sectors to
advance the ever-increasing high-quality service (Kabene
et al., 2006). In the finance industry, management
innovations that involve an accelerating use of
information technology have allowed major banks to
develop sales-oriented activities that require more
demanding skills than those required more than three
decades ago (Wilkinson, 1995). Given that service quality
and staff performance are key contributors to competitive
advantage in the financial service sector (Watkins &
Bryce, 1992), employers introduce high-performance
work systems comprising remuneration practices to
facilitate effective fund management performance
(Agarwal et al., 2003). Similarly, increasingly
international and marketized education implies growing
competition and rivalry in the education sector;
developing competitive advantage through effective
management practices is essential (Lodge, 2015).
Beyond the argument for a business case, research
shows that businesses operating in highly regulated
industries are coerced to comply with rules and
regulations that affect their work (Field, 2007), as well
as constantly installing innovative practices to abide by
fast-changing conduct rules. In the finance industry, for
example, remuneration-related practices are influenced
by external intervention from regulatory bodies (such as
bonus caps related to based salary regulated by EU
directives, Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), and
Financial Council Authority (FCA)); the resultant new
code of conduct will significantly impact the full HRM
lifecycle from recruitment and integrating to performance
management and termination (Higginbottom, 2015). For
example, the introduction of bonus caps of 100% of base
pay or 200% with shareholder approval challenges the
incentive practice commonly used as an effective tool to
attract and retain top-management talents since poaching
has long been a conventional recruitment approach in
banking (Wilkinson, 1995). The education sector has also
witnessed increasing demands for audit, evaluation and
other procedural regulatory instruments. Organisational
resources then shift away from the front lines of teaching
and research towards ‘a ballooning of armies of
university-based internal quality checkers and other
administrators’ (Lodge, 2015, p. 3), which popularises
CHRM practices such as performance appraisal,
goal-oriented management, teamwork, mentoring,
induction and performance-related pay (Middlewood &
Lumby, 2009). Hence, such practices must be in place to
ensure good quality and consistency throughout these
services. Thus, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 1. Relative to manufacturing, there is a
positive association between the service industry and
the uptake of CHRM across firms of different sizes.
In line with institutional theory, businesses seeking
legitimacy in specific industries, large or small, are
unexceptionally coerced to adopt management practices
to be qualified (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This would
appear to suggest that industry linearly predicts the
intensity of CHRM across firms of different sizes. Indeed,
successful small businesses with established market
identities within such sectors also report CHRM (Harney
& Dundon, 2006), albeit such an uptake still remains rare
compared to large firms (Forth et al., 2006; Wu
et al., 2014). Research in SMEs has argued that, given a
generally short life cycle, an urge for survival often
outweighs the impulse for formality (Ram et al., 2001;
Marlow, 2006). However, Kitching et al. (2015) observe
that there is no typical ‘small business effect’ of
regulation when it comes to businesses’ compliance with
conduct rules and regulations. In fact, the magnitude that
SMEs are coerced to adopt such practices to ensure a
successful pass of the entry barriers and gain legitimacy
in intensively regulated business sectors is likely to be
greater compared to large firms. This is because large
organisations often play a monopolistic role and exert
significant influence in the market in relation to best
practices in specific industries (Michie & Sheehan, 2005).
Research has also reported that the installation of CHRM
for a legitimate purpose may well stretch the already
limited resources an SME has and would not always
benefit their businesses’ economic performance (e.g.,
Way, 2002). Instead, it likely profoundly impacts the
intensity of CHRM practices adopted compared to other
SMEs operating in non-service industries, where the
entry barriers associated with regulatory requirements
are generally low. Overall, alongside severe competition
in the market, industry regulations and red tape are the
most cited obstacles to business success by SMEs
(Lomax et al., 2016). One would, therefore, anticipate
that SMEs operating in a highly competitive and
regulated industry are more compelled, if not purely
driven by high-performance motives, to engage with
CHRM practices than other smaller businesses.
Conversely, the influence of industry competition and
regulation on management practices in large
organisations is relatively mild for two reasons: first,
formality is a natural consequence for large organisations
to cope with complex business operations within a
bureaucratic organisational structure (Baird &
Meshoulam, 1988; Mintzberg & Waters, 1990; Reid
et al., 2000); and second, economies of scale allow large
organisations to spread the cost over a large scale of
workforce and are financially viable (Westhead &
Storey, 1996). Hence, we test:
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Hypothesis 2. The positive association between the
service industry and CHRM is negatively moderated
by firm size; namely, the associations are stronger when
firm size is smaller, but weaker when firm size is larger.
The association between family ownership
and CHRM
In contrast to the view that industry is one of the key
institutional factors associated with the uptake of CHRM in
strategic HRM literature, family ownership is widely
acknowledged as an antecedent of informality primarily
among SME study (where research findings are often
extrapolated to small business management). Research has
largely reported that owner-managed businesses are less
likely to adopt CHRM than non-family-owned businesses
(Fiegener et al., 1996), and the reason is twofold. First, from
business governance perspective, owner-managers are less
likely to delegate HRM authorities compared to non-
family-owned businesses, due to risk aversion and intention
to maintain family control and wealth (Gedajlovic
et al., 2004). Likely consequences include an emphasis on
the family link and direct control in business management,
which often direct family businesses to non-financial goals
and render professional management redundant (Faems
et al., 2005). Second, according to agency theory, CHRM
is adopted as a control measure to ensure the goals of
principals and agents are aligned so that moral hazards can
be minimised (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the
principal-agent dilemma is no longer a concern among
owner-managed companies because principal and agent are
the same one (deKok et al., 2006). This is because the shared
goals and values featured in family businesses usually lead to
a higher degree of cohesiveness and commitment of the
workforce (Lyman, 1991), so scrutiny and monitoring
through high-performance oriented practices are no longer
necessary.
Prior research of family business disproportionally views
owner-manager’s idiosyncrasies and direct control in
management as an explanation for the lack of formality in
SMEs (Lomax et al., 2016). Contrasting this, research
studying the impact of owner-management on the manner
of HRM in large firms remains rare. This is partly because
a large number of small businesses started as family
businesses (de Kok et al., 2006; Messersmith &
Guthrie, 2010), and owner-managers’ characteristics can
be very influential on shaping business development, in
particular in the early stages of a small family business
(Marlow, 2006). Hence, family business management
literature tends to view that proprietary control is mainly
an issue among SMEs, assuming bureaucracy in large
organisations will eventually mitigate the influence
of owner-manager’s interference in management.
Contradicting this, organisational imprinting theory
suggests that the footprints reflected in organisation patterns
set and managed by owner-managers stay in the
organisation and would have a lasting impact on
management modes at various stages of a firm’s life cycle
(Beckman & Burton, 2008; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013).
Despite that family businesses play a crucial role across
all economies (Aronoff & Ward, 1995; Chua et al., 1999),
family ownership (especially owner-management) has
rarely been examined in a large organisational context.
Drawing upon organisational imprinting theory, one would
anticipate that owner-managed businesses, large or small,
are less likely to employ non-family members and install
sophisticated HRM systems to minimise agency problems.
This leads to our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Owner-management is negatively
associated with the uptake of CHRM across firms of
different sizes.
Compared to the abundant evidence base that
informality is associated with family ownership in SMEs,
research studying the extent to which family ownership
would affect HRM in large firms is rare. A possible
explanation is that installing complex HRM systems is a
natural consequence when a small firm grows (Baird &
Meshoulam, 1988). The urge for enhancing formality to
cope with the increasingly complicated operation is likely
to outweigh family members’ attempt to maintain control
of the business. Resource availability and economies of
scale provide large organisations greater scope to
accommodate high-performance work practices, or they
are obliged to follow suit when bundles of CHRM
practices have become ‘table stake’ among large
competitors (Boxall & Purcell, 2008).
Opposing the universal view that CHRM will
eventually be adopted when organisations’ size grows, a
voice in family business management literature posits that
the modes of internal operations (aiming to strengthen
family control and family wealth) and approach to
responding to the environment are likely to persist within
owner-managed firms regardless of changes in firm size
(Kroon et al., 2013). This echoes organisational
imprinting effect-management patterns founded and
developed at a particular time may persist for years,
decades (Johnson, 2007; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011) or
even for generations in the case of family-owned
businesses. Beyond the linear causal relationship implied
by organisational imprinting theory, a small amount of
research nonetheless suggests family ownership may have
a greater negative impact on the uptake of CHRMwhen a
small family business expands, matures and becomes a
large family organisation (Salvato et al., 2012).
Owner-managers in large family organisations seeking to
protect their private benefits by manipulating resources
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at the board level are likely to inhibit professional
management, which likely leads to greater firm failure
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Ward (1987) observed that an
owner-manager sows the seeds of governance by using
informal mechanisms such as an advisory board and
family meetings to discuss business and family issues.
Additionally, owner-managed large family businesses
can use their long-established organisational culture to
reinforce a shared vision and value (Zahra et al., 2004).
Resultant cohesion and commitment in the workplace
imply there may be no need to implement complicated
monitoring systems; instead, path dependency would
suggest informality shaped under family governance is
likely to continue to prevail (Sciascia et al., 2013). In
contrast to extensive adoption of CHRM among most
large organisations, one would, therefore, anticipate
the deleterious effect of owner-management on the
uptake of CHRM is likely to be greater among large
owner-managed organisations than in smaller ones. This
is because the impact of the effort to strengthen
family control and wealth by minimising the intake of
HR expertise from outside the family is likely to be
greater in an owner-managed large firm than that in
an owner-managed small business. As discussed above,
we test:
Hypothesis 4. The negative association between
owner-management and CHRM is positively
moderated by firm size; namely, the negative
association is stronger when firm size is larger but
weaker when firm size is smaller.
Methods
Data and sample
The analysis draws data from the authoritative 2011
British Workplace Employment Relations (WERS11)
Study management survey (Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills, 2013). Designed to be nationally
representative of British workplaces with five or more
employees, the WERS 2011 survey comprises 2,680
observations from the most senior managers in the
workplaces with responsibility for employee relations
matters (van Wanrooy et al., 2013).
In line with the OECD (2005, p. 17) and the European
Commission’s (EC) (2003) method of defining small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), this analysis defines
smaller businesses as having between 10 and 249
employees and large firms as having 250 or more
employees in the private sector. To ensure these firms do
not have large overseas operations, this research follows
a conventional approach applied by other WERS users
(e.g., Wu et al., 2015) and excludes foreign-owned
workplaces and those with overseas subsidiaries from
the SMEs category. This produces a sample of 1,293
establishments that entails 534 SMEs and 759 large firms.
The frequency distribution for each variable under study
here, such as industry and family ownership, are reported
in the Appendix. To account for sample selection
probabilities and minimise non-response bias, the 2011
WERS surveyweight was applied throughout our analysis
(Deepchand et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2017).
Measures
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is an additive measure of 19
CHRMpractices commonly identified as important within
both strategic HRM research (e.g., Combs et al., 2006)
and small business management study (Way, 2002). The
additive measure of CHRM has also been widely
employed by studies using WERS datasets (e.g., Storey
et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2014; Wood & Ogbonnaya, 2018).
The robustness of this HRM measure (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.74) was also tested through constructing a single
HRM index via confirmatory factor analysis; both
measures were highly correlated (r = 0.97), which echoes
Wu et al.’s (2015) study. Table 1 presents the construction
of these variables.
Independent variables
Two contextual factors are studied here (as shown in
Table 2), with industry being primarily researched
among the strategic HRM literature (e.g., Combs
et al., 2006; Boxall & Purcell, 2008) and family ownership,
in particular owner-management, predominately
documented by SME literature (Rutherford et al., 2003;
Marlow, 2006). The construction of these independent
variables is consistent with prior studies that also use
WERS data (e.g., Bacon & Hoque, 2005; Wu et al., 2014;
Wood & Ogbonnaya, 2018). Industry is coded as a
categorical variable representing nine industries, where
manufacturing forms the base category and is coded
as ‘0’ (see Table 2). Family-owned and -managed
(owner-management) is coded as ‘1’, if a single individual
or family owning at least 25 per cent of the company share
is involved in day-to-day management on a full-time
basis. Workplaces are coded as family-owned but not
family-managed if an individual’s or family’s share of the
company is at least 25 per cent but they are not involved
in day-to-day management. Those workplaces in which
an individual or family owns less than 25 per cent of the
share are coded as non-family ownership.
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Moderator
To test the moderating effect of firm size, the analysis uses
a question included in the WERS 2011 management
survey asking, “How many employees in total are there
within your organisation in the UK?” The responses to
the question were based on size categories and then
converted to a linear measure of employment size for ease
of inferences. This was achieved by plotting the
cumulative distribution at the minimum value of each size
category, and a logarithmic line was then fitted to the
distribution (Hollister, 2004). Then, the median firm size
for the number of employees within each size category
was calculated by using the fitted cumulative distribution
(Parker & Fenwick, 1983). The fitted line achieved a good
fit with the original firm size bands (R2 = 0.987).1 The
linear measure of firm size was then centred at 249
employees (as stated above, SMEs are defined as having
between 10 and 249 employees in the private sector) to
assist a meaningful interpretation of the results as well as
to remedy multicollinearity between independent
variables and interactions (Cohen et al., 2003). Results
from the analysis with a categorical firm-size variable
(namely, SMEs vs. large organisations) are virtually the
same to those reported here.2 Given the continuous
firm-size variable facilitates a more direct dialogue
with the hypotheses developed here compared to the
Table 1 Construction of calculative CHRM
CHRM Items
Sophisticated recruitment Conducting either a personality/attitude test or performance/competency test in filling the largest occupational group
(LOG) vacancies.
Induction A standard induction programme designed to introduce new non-managerial employees belonging to the LOG to the
workplace and such induction activities normally lasting for at least 2 days (if counted in days) or at least 16 hours
(if counted in hours).
Off-the-job training At least 60 per cent of experienced LOGhave been given time off from their normal daily work duties to undertake training
over the past 12 months.
Internal labour market Preference is given to internal applicants, other things being equal, over external applicants, or internal applicants are the
only source in case of filling vacancies.
Individual performance-
related pay
At least 60 per cent of non-managerial employees at the workplace have their performance formally appraised and
individual employees’ pay is linked to the outcome of the performance appraisal.
Development appraisal At least 60 per cent of non-managerial employees at the workplace have their performance formally appraised and the
performance appraisal result in an evaluation of employees’ training needs.
Teamwork At least 60 per cent of the LOGat the workplace are working in formally designated teams, inwhich teammembers depend
on each other to do their job and team members jointly decide how the work is to be done.
Team briefing Meetings held at least weekly between line managers or supervisors and all the workers for whom they are responsible
(team briefing), in which more than 10 per cent of the time is usually available for questions from employees or for
employees to offer their view.
Communication Management communicates or consults with employees at the workplaces through least four of the following ways: notice
boards, systematic use of management chain, suggestion schemes, regular newsletters distributed to all employees;
regular use of email to all employees, information posted on company intranet.
Information sharing Management regularly give employees, or their representatives information about all three areas: internal investment plans,
financial position of the workplace/the whole organization and staffing plans.
Consultation committee Committees of managers and employees at the workplace, primarily concerned with consultation, rather than negotiation
(joint consultative committees, works councils or representative forums).
Employee attitude survey Employer or a third party conducted a formal survey of employee views or opinions during the past two years and the
results of the survey were made available in written form to those employees that took part.
Quality circles At least 60 per cent of LOG at the workplace have been involved in problem-solving groups, quality circles or continuous
improvement groups.
Functional flexibility At least 60 per cent of the LOG are formally trained to do jobs other than their own.
Benefits Three or more of the following non-pay terms and conditions apply to the LOG: employer pension scheme; private health




Four or more of the following are practised at the workplace: work-at- home; reduced working hours; compressed hours;
changed set working hours (including changing shift pattern); job sharing schemes; flexitime; maternity leave receiving
normal full rate of pay; working only during school term-time; workplace nursery or nursery linked with workplace;
financial help with child-care; financial help with the care of older adults; a specific period of leave for carers of
older adults.
Equal opportunities Recruitment and selection (or promotion procedures) are monitored or reviewed to identify indirect discrimination by at
least four of the following characteristics: gender, ethnic background, disability, age, sexual orientation, religion or
belief.
Grievance procedures Workplaces have all of the following four items: a formal grievance procedure; employees are required to set out in writing
the nature of the grievance; employees are asked to attend a formal meeting with a manager to discuss the nature of their
grievance; and employees have a right to appeal against a decision made.
Job security Job security or no-compulsory redundancies policies apply to the LOG at the workplace.
6 N. Wu
© 2020 The Authors
European Management Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Academy of Management
(EURAM)
categorical size variable, we report and interpret the results
from the analyses with the continuous firm-size variable in
the Results section.
Control variables
The regression analyses control for variables that also
account for the association between institutional/
organisational factors and the adoption of CHRM reported
elsewhere. These are workplace size (ranging from as few
as 10 to more than 100,000 employees); workplace age
(ranging from new start-ups to those with more than
25 years in business) and single establishment (Storey
et al., 2010); dummy variables for HR specialists
(De Winne & Sels, 2010); tenure contract; Investor in
People (IiP) (Hoque & Bacon, 2008); client requirement
(Bennett & Robson, 1999); benchmarking (Boxall &
Purcell, 2008); trade union (Greene, 1993); recession
(Wood & Ogbonnaya, 2018), skill mix (Wu et al., 2014),
and management consultancy (Klaas, 2008).
Results
Descriptive analysis
The correlation analysis, as shown in Table 2, does not
showmulticollinearity between any of the study variables.
To facilitate better understanding of the extent which firm
size may affect the influence that a range of contingency
factors (most of which are controlled to minimise any
confounding effect on the relationship between industry,
family ownership and the adoption of CHRM) may have
on the uptake of CHRM, we also construct a table (as
shown in the Appendix comprising variables’ mean in
smaller (or termed SMEs) and large organisations,
respectively. The results in the Appendix suggest that
overall uptake of CHRM in large firms (mean = 7.656)
is significantly higher than that in smaller businesses
(mean = 5.495) (t-value = 21.63, p < 0.000). Where
industry is concerned, smaller firms are more likely to
run businesses in manufacturing than large companies
(t-value = 4.10, p < 0.000). As expected, smaller firms
are more likely to be owner-managed (t-value = 14.57,
p < 0.000) than large organisations.
With regard to control variables, smaller firms are
less likely to benchmark against other companies
(t-test = 9.51, p < 0.000), hire an HR specialist
(t-value = 14.28, p < 0.000), or have union recognition
(t-value = 16.75, p < 0.000). In contrast, smaller firms
are more likely to seek advice from management
consultancy (t-value = 2.75, p < 0.003). Smaller businesses
also rarely have IiP recognition (t-value = 12.79,
p < 0.000). There is no evidence, however, suggesting
smaller workplaces have a much shorter life cycle when
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The association between contextual factors and CHRM
and the moderating effect of firm size
Survey hierarchical regression analyses, as shown in
Table 3, indicate steady increases in R2 from the basemodel
that is comprised of only control variables (R2 = 0.17; not
reported in the table) to Model 1 (ΔR2 = 0.21), Model 2
(ΔR2 = 0.02), and Model 3 (ΔR2 = 0.04), suggesting clear
improvement in goodness of fit by adding contextual
factors as well as firm size as a moderator. In Model 3,
where industry is concerned, Education’ (ß = 1.99,
p < 0.05), “Health” (ß = 1.62, p < 0.001) and ‘Other
community services’ (ß = 1.33, p < 0.01) are positively
associated with CHRM after interaction terms (contextual
factors interacted with firm size) were added. Hypothesis 1
is largely supported. As anticipated, firm size moderates the
associations between industry and CHRM. Statistically
significant associations with CHRM are demonstrated by
interaction terms of ‘Finance and other business
services*Firm size’ (ß = 0.36, p < 0.05),
“Education*Firm size” (ß = 0.64, p < 0.05),
“Health*Firm size” (ß = 0.75, p < 0.001). The negative
sign of the coefficients suggests that the smaller the firm
size, the greater the influence these industries exert on the
adoption of CHRM, thus lending support to Hypothesis 2.
To assist interpretation, themoderating effect of firm size
on the associations between industry and CHRM is plotted
in Figures 1a, 1b and 1c. Having centred the firm-size
variable at 249 employees, we plotted “smaller firms” as
1 standard deviation below the centred firm-size variable
(namely, 10–249 employees) and “Large firms” at 1
standard deviation above the centred firm-size variable
(namely, 250+ employees) (Aiken & West, 1991). Thus,
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c illustrate, compared to the
Table 3 Hierarchical regression analyses of the association between industries, family ownership and the uptake of CHRM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ß t-values ß t-values ß t-values
Industry
Ref. category = Manufacturing
Electricity/Construction 0.45 0.90 0.48 0.99 0.63 1.29
Wholesale and retail 0.27 0.65 0.45 1.10 0.90* 2.09
Hotels 1.11 1.95 0.95 1.64 0.51 0.83
Transportation 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.76 0.91
Finance/Other business services 0.93* 2.31 1.04* 2.58 0.57 1.37
Education 2.41† 3.91 2.69† 4.33 1.99** 3.26
Health 1.80** 3.46 1.95† 3.79 1.62** 3.43
Other community services 1.51** 2.88 1.61** 3.07 1.33* 2.51
Family ownership: Ref. category: Not family owned
Owner-managed 0.63* 2.47 0.40 1.52 0.52 1.91
Family-owned/not owner-managed 0.28 0.75 0.26 0.72 0.38 1.03
Firm size (Log)1 0.28† 3.78 0.63** 2.76
Interactions
Industry* Firm size: Ref. category = manufacture* Firm size
Electricity/Construction*Firm size 0.04 0.19
Wholesale and retail*Firm size 0.23 1.40
Hotels*Firm size 0.17 0.86
Transportation*Firm size 0.19 0.86
Finance/Other business services*Firm size 0.36* 2.05
Education*Firm size 0.64* 2.33
Health*Firm size 0.75† 4.02
Other community services*Firm size 0.42 1.82
Family ownership: Ref. category: Not family owned
Owner-managed*Firm size 0.25* 2.05
Family owned/not owner-managed*Firm size 0.11 0.82
Intercept 4.70† 6.89 4.53† 6.42 4.82† 6.72
N 1,293 1,293 1,293
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.38 0.41 0.44
Notes: Survey weighted OLS.
All equations control for single establishment, workplace age, workplace size, full time contract, skill mix, HR specialists, benchmarking, IiP recognition,




1 The Log value of firm size was calculated from a linear measure of employment size.
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‘Manufacture’ category, service categories such as ‘Finance
and other business services’,’Education’ and ‘Health;
demonstrate a greater influence on CHRM among smaller
firms than in large ones, respectively.
Turning to family ownership, as shown in Model 1 in
Table 3, owner-managed firms (ß = 0.63, p < 0.05) are
less likely to adopt CHRM compared to non-family
owned businesses. However, the association is no longer
statistically significant after controlling for firm size in
Model 2, suggesting the rare adoption of CHRM among
owner-managed firms is reliant upon firm size. Hence,
Hypothesis 3 is supported, indicating potential
non-linear effect of firm size on such association.
With regard to Hypothesis 4, we argued that
owner-management is likely to have a significantly
deleterious effect on the adoption of CHRM in large firms
rather than in small ones. This is confirmed by the
statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term
‘owner-managed*firm size’ (ß = 0.25, p < 0.05) in
Model 3. This was plotted in Figure 2, suggesting the
negative association between owner-management and
CHRM is stronger in large firms than in smaller firms.
Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported and firm size matters.
Where control variables are concerned, the results
(not included in Table 3) suggest that benchmarking
(ß = 0.76, p < 0.01), HR specialists (ß = 1.00,
p < 0.001), full-time contracts (ß = 1.03, p < 0.001),
skilled workers (ß = 0.83, p < 0.05), union recognition
(ß = 1.44, p < 0.001), and IiP award (ß = 0.83, p < 0.05)
are positively associated with the practice of CHRM;
these associations remain when the firm-size variable is
added in the regression. However, there is no evidence
suggesting any statistically significant moderating effect
of firm size on such associations. These suggest the set
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 1 a) Interaction Plot for CHRM in Finance and other business services by firm size, b) Interaction Plot for CHRM in Education sector by firm size, c)
Interaction Plot for CHRM in Health sector by firm size
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of contextual factors have consistent influence on the
prevalence of CHRM across firms of different sizes. The
findings also indicate that recent economic recession,
workplace age, client requirements and seeking advice
from management consultancy are not statistically related
to the adoption of CHRM at workplaces.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper set out to examine the extent to which the
institutional effect of industry and imprinting effect of
family ownership on CHRM varies between firms of
different sizes. Our findings provide new perspectives to
both institutional and organisational imprinting theories,
suggesting firms respond differently to certain
institutional/organisational factors when they grow from
smaller start-ups to large mature organisations.
Where Hypothesis 1 is concerned, our findings suggest
organisations, either small or large, are more likely to
adopt extensive CHRM if they operate in the health,
finance and education industries compared to those in
manufacturing. In resonance with the institutional theory,
a convergence of greater uptake of CHRM among
organisations operating in specific services suggests that
abiding by intensive and fast-changing regulations and
code of conduct is vital (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Paauwe & Boselie, 2003; Wood et al., 2014). Greater
regulatory impact among services than in manufacturing
would appear to suggest employee–customer interactions
are likely to demand further investment in advancing
employees’ skill-mix and providing high quality
products/services (Morrison, 1996; Boxall, 2003), rather
than regulation compliance mainly for producing and
marketing products in the manufacturing industry (Jaffe
et al., 1995). The positive relationships between these
services and the prevalence of CHRM remains consistent
across firms of different sizes, thus lending support to the
view that there is no small business effect with respect to
business compliance with industry norms and regulations
(Kitching et al., 2015).
In relation to Hypothesis 2, our analysis reports a
statistically significant moderation effect of firm size on
the association between specific services and the uptake
of CHRM; the association is stronger among SMEs than
large firms. These findings would appear to suggest that
the adoption of certain HRM practices among SMEs
tends to be more of a response to legal compliance than
a choice of being selective. Although our research does
not directly address the debate on the relationship
between CHRM and performance, the coercive effect of
regulations on the uptake of CHRM among SMEs begs
further questioning on the appropriateness of promoting
new management practices among SMEs as a way of
improving performance (Westhead & Storey, 1996).
Scholars sympathetic to small businesses (mainly from
the small-is-beautiful perspective) frequently argue that
the presence of a complex CHRM system may be a result
of institutional pressure – high entry barriers within
specific industries can create an extra bureaucratic burden
for small businesses’ development (Goss et al., 1994).
There has increasingly been a voice in SME literature in
the past decade suggesting that investment in CHRM
purely aiming to establish legitimacy may stretch
resource limits and render potential benefits yielded
from these practices cancelled out by extra costs stemmed
from such formality (Way, 2002; Wu et al., 2015; Lai
et al., 2017).
With regard to Hypothesis 3, we found that
owner-management is negatively associated with CHRM,
Figure 2 Interaction Plot for CHRM in owner-managed firms by firm size
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but such association disappears when firm size variable
enters the equation. This suggests the magnitude of the
deleterious effect that owner-management has on
formality depends on a firm’s size, namely, the effect is
likely to be non-linear. Rather than suggesting
owner-management has a more damaging effect on
formalisation among SMEs as argued in small business
management literature, the findings suggest that
owner-management is more likely to play a crucial role
in large firms than SMEs; thus, size matters (Aronoff &
Ward, 1995; Chua et al., 1999).
Turning to Hypothesis 4, our findings suggest that the
negative association between owner-management and
the uptake of CHRM becomes stronger when firm size
grows. This finding not only extends the long-held view
among the SME literature that owner-management is an
indicator of informality among smaller businesses (De
Massis et al., 2014), but also suggests that size does
not necessarily lead to formality: owner-management is
more likely to deter formalisation among large firms than
in smaller businesses. A possible explanation could be
that the piecemeal manner of adopting CHRM in
owner-managed SMEs hardly differentiates them from
other SMEs, in that the use of CHRM is generally low
compared to their larger counterparts (Storey, 1994;
Forth et al., 2006). Another possible explanation is
informed by the organisational imprinting theory.
Fearing loss of control, large owner-managed
organisations protecting their private benefits by
manipulating resources at the board level are likely to
persistently deter professional management and limit
the use of CHRM (McConaughy et al., 2001; Anderson
& Reeb, 2004). This is likely to occur on a larger scale
compared to what owner-managed SMEs can do. Given
that a CHRM system is a common management
approach among large organisations (Boxall &
Purcell, 2008), the holdback of introducing such
practices among large owner-managed organisations is
likely to present greater repercussions on management
professionalisation in larger firms than smaller ones. This
renders the criticism that family ownership (more
towards owner-management) being the scapegoat for
informality particularly among SMEs spurious. Overall,
these would appear to suggest the imprinting effect is
likely to be non-linear. This finding also casts doubt on
the big-is-better view in terms of formality being the
natural outcome of growth.
Alternatively, the findings would appear to suggest
that there may be other workplace characteristics
associated with firm size that have more explanatory
power for the rarity of professional practices than
family ownership. A few control variables in our study,
such as trade union, benchmarking, skill-mix and IiP
recognition, all demonstrate strong and positive
associations with the uptake of CHRM. Although they
are not the research focus in our study, they are
certainly of significant importance in their own right
should future research wish to explore further in
relation to the non-linearity of the institutional/
imprinting effect.
Overall, our findings lend support to both institutional
and imprinting perspectives of strategic HRM that the
adoption of CHRM within an organisation, small or
large, is influenced by both the industry in which it
operates and the proprietorship. The findings also extend
institutional theory (with a focus on coercive
isomorphism) that the norms and regulations set out
within specific industry sectors, such as finance, health
and education, have a much greater impact on the
prevalence of CHRM in small businesses than large
organisations; thus the institutional effect is non-linear.
This extends prior research that there is no small
business effect when it comes to regulation compliance
(Kitching et al., 2015) and, instead, suggests that the
regulatory effect among SMEs tends to be greater than
that for their large counterparts. What accounts for
another notable finding in the study is that the
organisational imprinting effect is not always linear;
instead, it is subject to firm size: owner-management
tends to play a more damaging role in large firms than
SMEs, if formalisation through CHRM is deemed
effective for performance improvement. Hence, large
owner-managed organisations may need to refrain from
constantly wielding family control at the expense of
formality, should economic performance be at the core
of their family business development.
Managerial implications
Practical implications are threefold. First, SMEs are more
responsive (coerced) to industry norms and regulations
than their large counterparts. This could be partly due to
their proximity to the external environment (Harney &
Dundon, 2006) and partly because of their lacking
economies of scale (Westhead & Storey, 1996). Compared
to their large rivals, the increasing uptake of CHRM
reported among SMEs in the last two decades may well
be a result of coercive effect (Bacon & Hoque, 2005)
rather than being driven by high-performance objectives,
as evidenced in many large organisations (Wu et al., 2015;
Lai et al., 2017). SME employers, therefore, tread a fine
line between choosing performance-effective practices
that work for them and those CHRM practices adopted
out of choice.
Second, in addition to identifying CHRM targeting
uniqueHR problems associated with various development
stages (Rutherford et al., 2003), future work also needs to
identify HRM practices that small businesses adopt
mainly as the result of external environmental pressure
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or as a marketing tool and differentiate those from
other CHRM for performance-enhancement purpose,
should the link between HRM and performance in
small businesses be better understood. This also calls
for a re-examination of potential regulatory burdens
on business development, particularly among SMEs
(Kitching et al., 2015; Lomax et al., 2016). This is
especially pertinent against the backdrop that government
policies promote performance-oriented HRM as an
effective approach to improve the overall performance
within the SME sector (Rowlatt, 2013). There has yet to
be any research conducted.
Another implication is concerned with the destructive
effect of owner-management on the uptake of CHRM in
large owner-managed firms compared to SMEs. Given
the economic importance of family businesses (87 per cent
of all private businesses in the UK) (IFB, 2017), coupled
with limited understanding of how family ownership
influences corporate governance and its adaptation to
formality (Gedajlovic et al., 2004), it is time to set up a
research agenda and study family ownership, specifically
owner-management from a governance perspective
across firms of different sizes, rather than viewing
owner-management as an issue mainly among SMEs.
Limitations
Like most research, this study is not without limitations.
The analysis is based on cross-sectional data collected from
individual respondents; hence, it is difficult to draw clear
causal inferences and may suffer from the commonmethod
bias (Podsakoff et al., 2013). Adopting Lindell and
Whitney’s (2001) approach, this study used geographical
locations of workplaces as a marker variable. First, the
correlation of this marker variable with other variables in
the analysis was tested, and the results show it is not
statistically related with CHRM and is unrelated to any of
the predictor variables. The correlations of the CHRM
contextual factors will remain significant (though with
slight variation in significant levels) after making the partial
correlation adjustment. This suggests the results reported in
this study are robust and cannot be accounted for by
common method variance.
Additionally, the analysis focuses on only two
institutional/organisational factors that are considered
important in strategic HRM and small business literature,
respectively, controlling for confounding factors such as
single establishment, union, skill-mix, workplace age, IiP
award, and workplace size. There are still equally important
factors that can shape the approach to HRM, but they were
not included in this study. Despite the advantages of a large
sample size and representation of the 2011WERS data, there
would appear to be significant scope for future research
exploring other contextual factors by interacting with firm
size, or to draw on different data sources and different
research designs in order to address these limitations.
Finally, the focus on two institutional and organisational
factors and their impact on the uptake of CHRMacross firms
of different sizes does not allow generalisation for other
institutional/organisational factors. Such a focus would
neither be able to address other types of institutional effect
such as mimetic or normative isomorphism, nor other
organisational factors. However, the analysis did account
for factors associated with different isomorphic processes
or organisational process as controls (for example,
benchmarking and management consultancy are factors
related to mimetic isomorphism and IiP award to normative
isomorphism, whereas workplace age is an important
organisational factor) to minimise the potential confounding
effect of such factors on the associations studied here.
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Appendix












(N = 534) (N = 759) (N = 1,293)
CHRM 5.495 7.656 6.423
Single establishment 0.599 0.008 0.345
Workplace size
5–9 employees 0.163 0.408 0.268
10–24 employees 0.597 0.261 0.453
25–49 employees 0.162 0.134 0.150
50–99 employees 0.062 0.086 0.072
100–249 employees 0.015 0.067 0.037
250–499 employees 0.031 0.013
500+ employees 0.014 0.006
Industry sector
Manufacturing 0.130 0.056 0.098
Electricity/construction 0.064 0.022 0.046
Wholesale and retail 0.209 0.456 0.315
Hotels 0.097 0.129 0.111
Transportation 0.021 0.053 0.035
Finance/Other business 0.260 0.145 0.211
Education 0.047 0.016 0.033
Health 0.130 0.083 0.110
Other community services 0.042 0.040 0.041
Benchmarking 0.320 0.603 0.441
HR specialist/expert 0.181 0.414 0.281
Full-time contract 0.582 0.403 0.505
Skill-mix 0.838 0.810 0.826
Union recognition 0.038 0.236 0.123
Recession 0.498 0.407 0.459
Family ownership








0–4 years 0.109 0.128 0.117
5–9 years 0.230 0.188 0.212
10–24 years 0.290 0.350 0.316
25+ years 0.371 0.334 0.355
Management consultancy 0.204 0.117 0.167
Clients’ Requirement 0.703 0.831 0.758
IiP recognition 0.110 0.496 0.276
Firm size (LOG) 1.881 3.111 0.263
Notes: Survey means.
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